Larcenous information leakage

Or, losing company data through laptop theft. ServerFault had an interesting question on this topic crop up the other day. Most of the answers were focused on private industry, but this is a topic that affects us governmental/educational types as well. In different ways, of course.

Unlike a private business that has business methods and data that are intellectual property, us governmental types have to live with variations on the Freedom of Information Act. Here in Washington State, it's called a Public Records Request. Either way, it is entirely probable that a correctly worded PRR would be able to retrieve any source-code we have. There are some regulations that limit what we can let out, such as FERPA (Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act), but mere business process is open for citizen review.

Because of FERPA, we're quite paranoid about student data. That kind of information doesn't tend to wander on laptops, but we still don't want to get listed. We have policies about this.

That said, while our budget realities mean that very few people have work-supplied laptops, a lot of private laptops do end up in the office. These are laptops that generally do not connect to the wired Ethernet, they connect via the same wireless networks all of our students use. They can't get directly at our Banner data there, but they can get at pretty much everything else.

I believe I've mentioned before now that Higher Ed networks do not look like Corporate networks.

  • We do not have 'whole disk encryption' policies though those might be coming.
  • We're currently updating our email policies to make even more clear that University business conducted in private email (ahem, gmail) is still subject to Public Records Requests and archiving requirements.
  • For a while our use of Blackberries exploded, but the iPhone/Android revolution is rapidly reducing that. However, the number of people reading work-email over these devices has only gone up (see also, revised email policy).
  • Due to internal politics, policies restricting the use of USB-drive blocking GPOs and other technologies is exceedingly hard to put into place. The same holds true for blocking access to off-campus WebMail and social media sites.
In short, it's hard to keep our data from wandering.

There is a very good reason why our Security Audits are interesting reading. We're a kind of unholy cross between an ISP network and a corporate network.