The SANS Diary had a post this morning
with the same title as this post. The bulk of the article is about how user attitudes have changed over time, from the green-screen era to today where any given person has 1-2 computing devices on them at all times. The money quote for my purposes is this one:
User 2.0 has different expectations of their work environment. Social and work activities are blurred, different means of communications are used. Email is dated, IM, twitter, facebook, myspace, etc are the tools to use to communicate. There is also an expectation/desire to use own equipment. Own phone, own laptop, own applications. I can hear the cries of "over my dead body" from security person 0.1 through to 1.9 all the way over here in AU. But really, why not? when is the last time you told your plumber to only use the tools you provide? We already allow some of this to happen anyway. We hire consultants, who often bring their own tools and equipment, it generally makes them more productive. Likewise for User 2.0, if using Windows is their desire, then why force them to use a Mac? if they prefer Openoffice to Word, why should't they use it? if it makes them more productive the business will benefit.
Here in the office several of us have upgraded to User 2.0 from previous versions. Happily, our office is somewhat accommodating for this, and this is good. I may be an 80% Windows Administrator these days, but that isn't stopping me running Linux as the primary OS on my desktop. A couple of us have Macs, though they both manage non-Windows operating systems so that's to be expected ;). I have seen more than one iPod touch used to manage servers. Self-owned laptops are present in every meeting we have. See us use our own tools for increased productivity.
The SANS Diary entry closed with this challenge:
So here is you homework for the weekend. How will you deal with User 2.0? How are you going to protect your corporate data without saying "Nay" to things like facebook, IM, own equipment, own applications, own …….? How will you sort data leakage, remote access, licensing issues, malware in an environment where you maybe have no control or access over the endpoint? Do you treat everyone with their own equipment as strangers and place them of the "special" VLAN? How do you deal with the Mac users that insist their machines cannot be infected? Enjoy thinking about User 2.0, if you send in your suggestions I'll collate them and update the diary.
Being a University we've always had a culture that was supportive of the individual, that Academic Freedom thing rearing its head again. So we've had to be accommodating to this kind of user for quite some time. What's more, we put a Default-Deny firewall between us and the internet really
late in the game. When I got here in 2003 I was shocked and appalled to learn that the only thing standing between my workstation
and the Internet were a few router rules blocking key ports; two months later I was amazed at just how survivable that ended up being. What all this means is that end-user factors have been trumping or modifying security decisions for a very long time, so we have experience
with these kinds of "2.0" users.
When it comes to end-user internet access? Anything goes. If we get a DMCA notice, we'll handle that when it arrives. What we don't do is block any sites of any kind. Want to surf hard-core porn on the job? Go ahead, we'll deal with it when we get the complaints.
Inbound is another story entirely, and we've finally got religion about that. Our externally facing firewall only allows access to specific servers on specific ports. While we may have a Class B IP block and therefore every device on our network has a 'routable' address, that does not mean you can get there from the outside.
As for Faculty/Staff computer config, there are some limits there. The simple expedient of budget pressure forces a certain homogeneity in hardware config, but software config is another matter and depends very largely on the department in question. We do not enforce central software there beyond anti-virus. End users can still use Netscape 4.71 if they really, really, really want to.
Our network controls are evolving. We've been using port-level security for some time, which eliminates the ability of students to unplug the ethernet cable connected to a lab machine and plug it into their laptop. That doesn't stop conference rooms where such multi-access is expected. And we only allow one MAC address per end-port, which eliminates the usage of hubs and switches to multiply a port (and also annoy VMWare users). We have
a 'Network Access Control' client installed, but all we're doing with it so far is monitor; efforts to do something with it have hit a wall. Our WLAN requires a WWU login for use, and nodes there can't get everywhere on the wired side. Our Telecom group has worked up a LimboVLAN for exiling 'bad' devices, but it is not in use because of a disagreement over what constitutes a 'bad' device.
However, if given the choice I can guarantee
certain office managers would simply love
to slam the bar down on non-work related internet access. What's preventing them from doing so are professors and Academic Freedom. We could have people doing legitimate research that involves viewing hard core porn, so that has to be allowed. So the 'restrict everything' reflex is still alive and strong around here, it has just been waylaid by historic traditions of free access.
And finally, student workers. They are a second class citizen around here, there is no denying that. However, they are the very definition of 'User 2.0' and they're in our offices providing yet another counter-weight to 'restrict-everything'. Our Helpdesk has a lot of student workers, so we end up with a fair amount of that attitude in IT itself which helps even more.
Universities. We're the future, man.